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I. INTRODUCTION
On the 7th of July 2005 (henceforth 7/7), four extremist Islamic terrorist bombers targeted London’s
transport network, killing 52 passengers and injuring hundreds more. Using pre-recorded statements, the
bombers threatened further acts of terrorism. Indeed, just two weeks later, a further four suicide bombers
attempted but failed to execute similar attacks.
The bombings and bombers attracted considerable media attention. Extensive coverage was given to the
fact that three of the four 7/7 bombers were British born with Pakistani heritage, raising concerns over
the integration and radicalisation of British Muslims (EUMC, 2005). Despite condemnation of the attacks
by key Muslim organisations, four weeks after the initial bomb attacks, faith-hate crimes had risen by
600 percent compared to the previous year (Greater London Authority, 2006). These attacks targeted all
Asians, including non-Muslim Asians, with Mosques as well as, for example, Sikh temples being subject to
reprisal attacks,1 suggesting pervasive effects of the bombings on racial prejudice.
Evidence from the Citizenship Survey also points to a rise in prejudice after the bombings. For example, a
12 percentage point increase in the proportion believing “more religious prejudice exists today compared
with 5 years ago” is observed in interviews taking place just after 7/7 compared with just before. Notably,
the proportion identifying Muslims as the victims of prejudice almost doubled in interviews post 7/7,
increasing to 50% (DCLG, 2006).2
We investigate the effects of the London bombings on attitudes towards ethnic minorities across Greater
London boroughs, as reflected in activity in the housing market (house prices and sales), the labour market
(unemployment rates and earnings), as well as ethnic segregation, using a difference-in-differences (DD)
approach. With all existing studies of the London bombings using (household) survey data and focusing
on the labour market, the contribution of this paper is to consider a wider set of outcomes, to document
the speed with which individuals learn about changes in the general attitude towards ethnic minorities, as
well as how these ‘learning effects’ vary across the different outcomes. In addition, we use borough-level
administrative data to deal with the fact that even the larger UK household surveys contain relatively
small ethnic minority samples.
1www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/sep/05/religion.july7
2Such changes in racial or religious prejudice against UK Muslims have not been reported after the 9/11 attacks in the US,
suggesting that there may be differences in people’s reactions depending on whether it occurred in one’s own country. The
Citizenship Survey is a survey in England and Wales that explores issues such as perceptions of community cohesion, race
and faith. For more information, see http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/research/citizenshipsurvey.
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We focus on Greater London boroughs, rather than the whole of the UK, for three reasons. First, the
bombings arguably had a larger impact on the day-to-day lives of Londoners, compared to others, given
the disruption to transportation networks and a visible increase in police presence immediately after the
bombings (Draca et al., 2011). Second, with almost 8 million people at the time of the bombings, London
is the UK’s most populous city. We exploit its diversity of ethnic populations across boroughs to identify
treatment and control boroughs. Finally, although there are other large and ethnically diverse UK cities,
there are no reliable estimates of the ethnic composition for lower-level geographies. Birmingham, for
example, is very ethnically diverse, but the whole of Birmingham constitutes one Local Authority, with no
population ethnicity data available at lower levels.
Our results show that, relative to ‘control’ boroughs, house prices in ‘treated’ boroughs fell by approx-
imately 2% in the two years after the attacks, with sales falling by almost 6%. While unemployment
increased by almost 6%, there is little evidence of changes in average earnings. We also find evidence of a
rise in segregation, with the proportion of Asians in treated areas increasing after the bombings, relative
to control areas. These results are robust to various sensitivity analyses with respect to different timings
and definitions of treatment, though we do find slightly weaker housing market effects once we specify a
control group that is more similar to the treatment group. Furthermore, we find some evidence of ‘learning
effects’, with our results indicating a cumulative impact on house prices and unemployment rates, but an
immediate effect on sales.
The paper is structured as follows: Section II reviews the literature and Section III discusses the conceptual
framework and empirical strategy. The different data sources are described in Section IV. Section V
discusses our results, and Section VI presents the robustness checks and extensions. Section VII concludes.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
There is a large literature on racial prejudice and discrimination in housing and labour markets (see e.g.
Yinger, 1998; Lang and Lehmann, 2012). A recent set of papers exploit the occurrence of terrorist activity
as a plausibly exogenous shock to racial prejudice. Initially, this strand of the literature focused on the
labour market outcomes of ethnic minorities in the US following the 9/11 attacks, with some evidence of
- at least - a temporary decline in earnings (Da´vila and Mora, 2005; Kaushal et al., 2007). Gould and
Klor (2012) also find evidence of an increase in racial segregation insofar as Muslims were more likely to
marry other Muslims and less likely to marry non-Muslims after these attacks. Despite deteriorating public
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opinion towards ethnic minorities after 9/11 outside the US (Aslund and Rooth, 2005; Schuller, 2012; Goel,
2010), there is little evidence of adverse labour market outcomes in Sweden (Aslund and Rooth, 2005) and
Canada (Shannon, 2012), with mixed evidence for Germany (Braakmann, 2009; Cornelissen and Jirjahn,
2012).3
All existing studies of the effect of the London bombings on racial discrimination use (household) survey
data and are confined to labour market outcomes. Braakmann (2010) investigates the impact of the
bombings on the employment probability, hours, and earnings of Arabs, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and
Muslims in Britain. While his findings suggest no clear patterns of the outcomes for the treated relative to
various control groups, there is weak evidence that the earnings and employment probabilities of Pakistanis
and Bangladeshis actually increased relative to other non-white minorities. In contrast, Rabby and Rodgers
(2010) find evidence of a decline in the employment and earnings of younger, but not older, Arab immigrants
relative to other immigrants.
Other research has looked to the housing market for evidence of discrimination towards ethnic minorities
following terrorist attacks, since house prices and sales are likely to reflect preferences for living among
ethnic minorities. Gautier et al. (2009) examine the impact of the murder of TV-host and film maker Theo
van Gogh in 2004 in Amsterdam on house prices in ‘treated’ neighbourhoods (defined as those with more
than 25% of its population from Turkey or Morocco) compared to control neighbourhoods within the city.
Their results suggest that house prices in treated neighbourhoods fell by 0.07% per week, resulting in a 3%
difference 10 months after the murder. In addition, they find some evidence of an increase in segregation,
with Muslims being more likely to buy, but less likely to sell a house in treated areas after the murder
compared to before.
III. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
We investigate the effects of the London bombings on the housing market (house prices and the number
of sales), the labour market (unemployment rates and earnings), as well as racial segregation. For the
housing market, we adopt a hedonic house price framework (see Rosen, 1974), characterising the price of
3The literature on the consequences of terrorism also examines the effect on economic activity, including asset prices. For
example, Besley and Mueller (2012) consider the effect of on-going terrorism in Northern Ireland on house prices, exploiting
the time-varying pattern of terrorist-related violence across regions, while Abadie and Dermisi (2008) examine the impact
of the 9/11 attacks on the demand for rental units in tall landmark buildings in Chicago. In contrast to our study, however,
these papers examine the effects of increased exposure to acts of terrorism, as opposed to the backlash that acts of terrorism
may have on minority groups.
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a house as a function of many attributes, including the characteristics of the surrounding neighbourhood.
Within this framework, the London bombings may have influenced the desirability of living in ethnically
diverse London boroughs, with any changes in the perception of living in these neighbourhoods reflected
in the price of housing. A priori, however, it is not clear exactly how the London bombings would alter
buyers and sellers appraisals of living in ethnically diverse boroughs.
On the one hand, the London bombings may have reduced the desirability (among whites) of living in
ethnically diverse neighbourhoods, which would be consistent with a negative shock to attitudes to ethnic
minorities. Even if an individual is happy to live in an ethnically diverse area, they might be concerned
about the re-sale value of their property, particularly if there is reason to believe that the general public
views properties in these areas as less desirable after the bombings (see Gautier et al., 2009).
On the other hand, people may reason that ethnically diverse London boroughs are relatively safer, if it is
considered that areas with large ethnic communities are less likely to be targeted by any potential future
terrorist activity. This would suggest that the desirability of living in such areas would increase after the
attacks. However, safety concerns may also operate to diminish the attractiveness of living in ethnically
diverse boroughs. The reason is that a number of these boroughs are centrally located, so if it is believed
that centrally located boroughs in general face a greater risk of being targeted in any potential future
terrorist activity, safety concerns may reduce the desirability of living in these ethnically diverse areas.
Such fears may additionally have been compounded by the sharp increase in police presence in specific
boroughs after the bombings, including in ethnically diverse boroughs (see Draca et al., 2011). We discuss
this in more detail below.
It is possible that all of these factors operate to shape house prices in ethnically diverse neighbourhoods.
Note also that any change in the desirability of living in ethnically diverse areas affects both the demand
for, and the supply of houses in those boroughs. Although the market price and the number of sales are
determined by both buyers and sellers, our data do not allow us to isolate the change in house prices and
number of sales due to variations in supply or in demand. Our results therefore reflect the net (overall)
impact of the shock on the behaviour of buyers and sellers, and with that, on average house prices and
total sales. We use the following difference-in-differences (DD) approach:
yjt = β(treatedj × postt) + αpostt + ηj + δt + εjt (1)
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where yjt denotes the (natural) log of the average house price or number of sales in borough j and time t.
treatedj × postt equals 1 for treated areas from July 2005 onwards, postt equals 1 from July 2005 onwards,
ηj are borough fixed effects, and δt denote month dummies. The random error term is denoted by εjt, and
is clustered at the borough-level to correct for clustering and autocorrelation (Bertrand et al., 2004). The
parameter β provides the estimated effect of the London bombings on house prices and sales in treated
relative to control boroughs. To ensure that house prices follow a similar trend in treated and control
boroughs prior to the bombings, we restrict our main analysis to a time window incorporating two years
pre and two years post the bombings (i.e. July 2003-June 2007), though we examine the sensitivity of the
results to the use of a longer time period.
We use a similar DD approach to estimate the effects of the bombings on labour market outcomes as
well as segregation, replacing yjt with the (natural) log of the unemployment rate, the average earnings of
residents, the total population and the populations of whites, blacks and Asians in the borough.
These analyses, comparing the change in outcomes across treated and control boroughs, require several
assumptions. First, treatment is assumed to be exogenous, which is likely to hold, as the attacks were
unanticipated. Second, the DD approach assumes a common trend across treatment and control areas prior
to the bombings. We examine this in Section VI.A, incorrectly setting the treatment year to a year prior
to the bombings. If the common time trend assumption holds, we would expect no effect of the incorrectly
specified treatment years on our outcomes of interest. As our full data run from 1995 (housing and labour
market) and 2000 (ethnicity), we additionally test the validity of this assumption and the robustness of
the results by controlling for differential trends.
A third assumption is that the composition of treatment and control groups remains stable over time.
While houses are clearly fixed and cannot move between neighbourhoods, we analyse the average price of
all houses sold in a borough. Hence, if the type of property put on the market changes in response to the
attacks, this assumption may be violated. For example, if there is an increase in sales of cheaper properties
(such as flats) after the bombings, the average house price will fall simply due to a composition effect,
even if there is no change in the price of flats or other property types. Note, however, that we analyse the
log of house prices, which requires the weaker assumption that the percent change is comparable across
various property types.4 Similarly, although houses are fixed, people may move between different areas. If,
for example, whites are more likely to move from treated to control neighbourhoods after the bombings,
4We do not observe the London rental market but we assume that activity in rental markets is similarly affected by the
attacks.
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this may raise house prices in control areas and overestimate the treatment effect. In contrast however, if
ethnic minorities prefer to live in treated boroughs after the attacks, increased housing demand in treated
areas may underestimate the treatment effect. We cannot distinguish between these processes. As such,
our analysis identifies the combined effect of the bombings on house prices, which may (partly) be driven
by changes in the ethnic composition of the population in treated versus control areas. We come back to
this below.
The same holds for the analyses on labour market outcomes. If, for example, Asians have higher average
unemployment rates, and if they are more likely to move into treated areas after the bombings, it may
seem as if the bombings increased unemployment rates, whereas this can simply be driven by a change
in the population composition of treated compared to control boroughs. We examine whether population
movements may affect our results in two ways: first, by analysing this directly, investigating the effect of the
bombings on the ethnic composition in treated versus control areas, and with that, on racial segregation;
and second, by including the ethnic populations as covariates.
A final assumption requires other contemporaneous changes to have similar effects on outcomes in treated
and control boroughs. One possible violation of this assumption is the announcement of the London
Olympics, which happened just before the attacks. The Olympic bid included proposals to regenerate
parts of East London, and in particular, Newham, which is part of our treatment group. Assuming that
people are forward looking however, expected regeneration should increase house prices in these treated
areas. Similarly, to the extent that any regeneration of East London started within our observations
window, it should decrease unemployment rates in treated areas. In both instances, the treatment effect
would be underestimated.5
IV. DATA
We combine information from several sources to obtain one dataset that includes data on the housing
market, the labour market and the ethnic composition of residents in the 32 London boroughs. Data on
the housing market are obtained from the Land Registry, which provides monthly statistics on seasonally
5Note that changes to immigration policy due to the bombings are unlikely to be driving our results, as securitization of
UK migration policy was well under way prior to the bombings (Hampshire and Saggar, 2006). Similarly, there is little
evidence that the bombings led to differential changes in public spending patterns for treated and control boroughs, which
might otherwise influence house prices and residential choices. Spending by local government is highly centralised in the
UK with no evidence of any changes in centrally-determined spending-allocation rules in the period after the bombings
(see Crawford et al., 2009).
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adjusted average house prices and number of sales in London boroughs. The data provide a complete record
of residential property transactions in England and Wales from 1995. We adjust all monetary figures for
inflation using the RPIY series (RPI minus mortgage interest payments).
Data on the labour market are obtained from Nomis, a website specialising in supplying labour market
statistics for low-level geographies. We use monthly data on borough-level (male) unemployment rates,
which are based on the receipt of unemployment-related benefits. We also use annual data on (male)
average weekly full-time earnings of residents, available from 2002 to 2008. The latter originates from
the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, which is based on a 1% sample of employees appearing in the
pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) taxation system, covering all types of employees in all types of businesses. Similar
to the house price data, earnings data are adjusted for inflation using the RPIY.
Monthly, as opposed to yearly, data on house prices, sales, and unemployment rates allow us to clearly
delineate pre and post treatment periods, and to analyse month-level data over a specific number of
treatment years, where each ‘treatment year’ starts in July and finishes in June. Thus in our main
analysis, where we focus on two years pre and post bombings, we analyse month-level data between the
period July 2003-June 2007, with July 2005 onwards comprising the post-treatment period. In contrast,
for the earnings data, which are available annually and by calendar year only, we must drop the year
2005 from our analysis to create a clean pre and post period, and thus analyse annual-level data for the
pre-treatment period spanning 2003-2004 and post-treatment period spanning 2006-2007.
We obtain data on the total population and ethnic composition of each borough from the Office for National
Statistics Population Estimates by Ethnic Group (PEEG; ONS, 2009), available from 2001. Data on each
borough’s total population correspond to the Mid-Year Population Estimates, which are the main source
of annual population estimates in England, with the key innovation of PEEG data being the provision of
local-level ethnic population estimates. These data estimate the relevant ethnic population at June 30th
each year, by taking the population estimate from the previous year, and adjusting for estimated births,
deaths and national/international migration by ethnic populations occurring over the year. The base
population, from which the ethnic population estimates are derived, is the 2001 Census.6 Hence, PEEG
6The primary objective of PEEG data is to provide small-area ethnic population estimates produced in accordance with the
principals set out in the National Statistics Code of Practice. There is some evidence, however, that PEEG overestimates
births to the white population and underestimates internal migration of ethnic minorities relative to other data sources
such as the Annual Population Survey (ONS, 2012). As our estimation strategy (fixed effects) takes into account systematic
differences in population, any time-invariant mis-measurement in the calculation of births and internal migration is unlikely
to influence our results. In line with this reasoning, when we use only PEEG estimates of populations aged 16 and over to
define treatment and to analyse population changes - thus removing any issues relating to estimated births - our findings
are unchanged.
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data provide an estimate of the ethnic composition in London boroughs one week prior to the London
attacks, using the same definitions of ethnicity that are used in the Census.7 Note that while we use the
2005 PEEG data to define treated and control boroughs (i.e. using population estimates on 30 June 2005),
when we analyse population movements below, we match each PEEG release to the preceding treatment
year. For example, the 2001 PEEG, which estimates population movements between July 2000 and June
2001, is matched to the treatment year 2000, also spanning the period July 2000-June 2001. Sources and
availability of all data used in our analysis can be found in Table A1, Appendix A.
We define treated neighbourhoods according to the distribution of Asians (including Indians, Pakistanis,
Bangladeshis and Other Asians) on the basis that reprisal attacks following the bombings affected non-
Muslim Asians as well as Muslim Asians.8 More specifically, a London borough is treated if the percentage
of Asian residents in the borough on the 30th of June 2005 falls in the highest quintile of this distribution.9
As shown in Figure 1, these boroughs are located in West (Harrow, Brent, Ealing and Hounslow) and East
London (Tower Hamlets, Newham and Redbridge).10
Previous research that uses the Asian population to define treatment typically excludes Indians on the basis
that it is not clear whether Indians should be assigned to the treatment or control group (see e.g. Kaushal
et al., 2007; Braakmann, 2010). Indeed, the majority of Indians in London are Hindus or Sikhs, of whom
just 9% practice Islam (DCLG, 2009b). In contrast, the majority faith among Pakistanis, Bangladeshis
and Other Asians is Islam, respectively representing 98%, 92%, and 37% (DCLG, 2009a,c; ONS, 2005).
We therefore consider two additional definitions of treatment based on ethnicity. First, we define treated
boroughs as those in the top quintile of the distribution of Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and other Asians.
This alternative definition leads to the London borough of Waltham Forest replacing Ealing as a treated
borough. Second, we define treated neighbourhoods as those in the highest quintile of the distribution of
Pakistani residents, since three of the four 7/7 bombers were of Pakistani descent, with some elements of
7These are white (subdivided into white British, white Irish and other white, black (Caribbean, African, and other black),
mixed (including white and black Caribbean, white and black African, white and Asian, other mixed), Asian or Asian
British (with subcategories Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, other Asian), and Chinese or other ethnic group.
8Hence, we do not include Chinese and those from the Far East in our definition of treated boroughs. In fact, individuals
from the Philippines, Japan, Vietnam, and Thailand are mainly included in the Census group ‘other ethnic groups’, and
have not been associated with any reprisal attacks. We instead use these in a ‘falsification check’ below. In addition,
dropping the City of Westminster from the analyses, home to London’s Chinatown, does not alter the findings (results
available from the authors upon request).
9Defining treated neighbourhoods as those in the highest quintile of the ratio of Asians to whites, rather than Asians per se,
or defining treated neighbourhoods as those in the highest quintile of the distribution of Asian residents including “mixed
white and Asians” leads to same grouping of treated and control boroughs.
10Note that the City of London is not a London Borough and is excluded from our analyses. It is dominated by just one
residential area: the Barbican Estate. Although over 400,000 people commute to the City of London for work, only around
7,000 people actually live there (DBE, 2014).
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the press providing a negative portrayal of this group in particular (EUMC, 2005). Using this treatment
definition, Tower Hamlets is replaced by Waltham Forest.
Finally, we run two ‘falsification checks’, defining treatment based on ethnic minority groups that we argue
are unlikely to experience an increase in racial prejudice after the bombings. We refer to these as ‘pseudo
treated’ boroughs. For example, while the failed July 21st bomb attacks were carried out by North African
Muslims, Black minorities did not bear the brunt of reprisal attacks. In addition, any media reports about
violence and crime involving blacks (as victims or suspects) generally concern crimes such as robbery,
drug and gun offences (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2007), rather than religion. This is
consistent with the results in Davila and Mora (2005), who find that with the majority of media coverage
after 9/11 focusing on the Middle East, there are significant declines in the earnings of Middle Eastern
Arab men in the US, with no changes for African Arab men. Hence, we do not expect to find differences
in the outcomes of interest in Black treated areas. Likewise, we do not expect to find any effects against
those from East Asia, and define boroughs with a high proportion of ‘Chinese or other ethnic group’ as a
second ‘pseudo treated’ group.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the different definitions of treated boroughs (columns 1-3),
‘pseudo’ treated boroughs (columns 4-5) and control boroughs (column 6). This shows that house prices
are lower in treated boroughs compared to control boroughs. Similarly, treated boroughs generally have
higher unemployment rates, lower earnings and are more populous.
The top row of Figure 2 presents the log of house prices and sales for treated and control London boroughs,
depicting two years pre and two years post bombings (July 2003 to June 2007). The bottom row depicts
the difference between these two groups over the observation period. This shows a relatively constant
difference in house prices and sales during the pre-treatment period, with some evidence of a decline in
house prices and sales for treated boroughs after the bombings. Figure 3 presents the graphs for the labour
market outcomes, also showing no strong evidence of differential trends prior to the bombings, but with
an increasing gap afterwards. We examine the common time trend assumption in more detail below.
V. RESULTS
Table 2 presents results from the DD specification shown in equation 1. The analysis on the housing
market, Panel A, clearly indicates a drop in house prices and sales in treated boroughs after the London
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bombings. The estimates in column 1 suggest that house prices in treated areas fell by approximately 2.3%
in the two-year period after the attacks, with a decline of approximately 5.7% in sales.
The results in column 1 are based on the premise that individuals of Asian appearance were affected, as was
intimated by media reports immediately following the London bombings. Focusing specifically on those
more likely to be Muslim, however, leads to very similar estimates. Indeed, excluding Indians (column
2) or using only Pakistanis (column 3) shows similar estimates to those in column 1. In contrast, and as
expected, columns 4 and 5 of Table 2 provide little evidence of a change in house prices or sales in the
‘pseudo’ treated boroughs, confirming our hypothesis that the bombings only affected attitudes towards
Asians, rather than leading to a general increase in racial prejudice.
Panel B of Table 2 shows the DD estimates of the effect of the bombings on labour market outcomes,
examining unemployment rates and average earnings. This indicates a 5.8% rise in unemployment rates
across individuals living in treated relative to control boroughs. The estimates are robust to the use of
different treatment definitions. However, we find no evidence of any change in earnings. The existing
literature that examines the earnings of UK Muslims indeed shows mixed evidence, with Braakmann
(2010) finding no (or even a positive) effect, and Rabby and Rodgers (2010) finding a decline in earnings.
It may be that these differential findings are driven by heterogeneous effects on different subgroups. Indeed,
Rabby and Rodgers (2010) only find significant effects on younger (but not older) workers. Unfortunately,
however, our data do not allow us to examine this in more detail.
Panel C of Table 2 shows the DD estimates for the analyses examining changes in the total population
and ethnic composition. These show that, although the total population has not changed differentially in
treated compared to control areas after the bombings, the white and Asian population did. In fact, the
analyses suggest that the population of whites increased in treated areas, whilst the population of Asians
decreased. As we show below, however, this is driven by differential time trends in the composition of
Asians and whites prior to the bombings. When we take this into account in Section VI.B, the results
reverse, suggesting that the bombings led to an increase in racial segregation. We come back to this below.
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VI. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND EXTENSIONS
A. Falsification checks
Table 3 presents results for a series of falsification checks, where we define the bombings to occur in the
years prior to 2005 using our preferred treatment definition of Asian minorities. For example, column 1
defines the attacks as occurring in 1997 instead of 2005 and analyses the period July 1995 to June 1999.
Columns 2 to 7 specify the treatment years as 1998 to 2003, each including data from two years pre and two
years post the treatment. None of these falsification checks show evidence of a significant treatment effect
on house prices, sales, or unemployment, suggesting that the estimates in Table 2 capture the changes in
the outcomes of interest caused by the London bombings.
Since our earnings data start in 2002, and are measured on a calendar-year basis (see Table A1), we cannot
run the full falsification analyses for earnings. Instead, we can specify either 2003 as the treatment year
(i.e. setting 2002 as pre-treatment and 2003-2004 as post-treatment) or 2004 as the treatment year (i.e.
setting 2002-2003 as pre-treatment and 2004 as post-treatment). We find an increase in earnings in the
treated boroughs relative to those in control boroughs prior to the bombings, with a statistically significant
effect when 2003 is specified as the treatment year (results available upon request). This suggests that
our finding of a zero treatment effect could be genuine or it could reflect a leveling off of an upward trend
in earnings in treated relative to control boroughs after the bombings. Due to a lack of earnings data for
earlier years, we cannot account for differential trends prior to the bombings. Hence, we no longer examine
this outcome.
Table 4 presents the falsification analysis for the population variables. As we discuss in Section IV and
the Appendix, our population estimates span the period July (t-1) to June (t), which corresponds to
treatment year (t-1), starting from July 2000. We can therefore incorrectly set the treatment year as 2002
and 2003, whilst retaining data for the two years pre- and post-treatment. While we find no evidence of
pre-treatment changes in the total population using our falsification analysis, the results show that the
ethnic composition of London boroughs changes in the treatment relative to control boroughs prior to
the bombings. Specifically, we observe an increase in the white population and a decrease in the Asian
population in treated compared to control areas, with no significant differences for the black population.
These differential trends prior to 2005 imply that we cannot simply attribute the ethnic composition effects
observed in Table 2 to the bombings. Instead, we need to account for differential trends.
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B. Differential time trends
To account for any differential trends in the ethnic composition prior to the bombings, we re-run the DD
analysis, additionally including linear time trends for treated and control boroughs. Although the evidence
above only suggests there are differential trends in the evolution of the ethnic composition, we examine
the robustness of all outcomes to the use of differential trends. Starting with columns 1-3 of Table 5,
we examine the effects of the bombings on house prices, sales, and unemployment using all available pre-
treatment years of data (i.e. from July 1995) to include (monthly) time trends. The findings support our
earlier analyses. For example, columns 1 and 2 show that the bombings led to a drop in house prices and
sales of 2.3% and 9% respectively. Although the estimate for sales is slightly larger than that in Table 2,
so are the standard errors. Column 3 presents evidence of an unemployment effect that is similar to that
presented in Table 2 but is not statistically different from zero due to an inflated standard error.
We investigate the total population and ethnic composition of boroughs taking into account yearly time
trends using data from 2001 (i.e. July 2000-June 2001) onwards; the earliest year for which we observe
the ethnic composition (see Table A1). This shows no effects of the bombings on the total population
or the white population, but an increase in Asians in treated neighbourhoods. The results suggest that,
although there is a significant reduction in the Asian population prior to the bombings (see Table 4, as
well as the coefficient on Treated× time in Table 5), this is partly offset by an increase of approximately
3.2% after the bombings. In other words, controlling for differential trends in the ethnic composition for
treated and control boroughs, we find that the bombings led to an increase in racial segregation, with the
Asian population in treated areas increasing by approximately 3.2%.
C. Variable treatment intensity
Our definition of treatment identifies boroughs in the top quintile of the Asian distribution. We also consider
an ‘intensity of treatment’ specification by interacting the post treatment dummy with the proportion of
Asians in a borough, which allows the treatment effect to linearly increase as ethnic diversity increases.
The results, presented in Table 6, indicate that a one percentage point increase in the proportion of Asians
leads to a 0.1% drop in house prices, a 0.3% drop in sales, and a 0.3% increase in the unemployment rate.
Similar to Table 2, there is no change in the total population in treated relative to control boroughs.11
11As this analysis does not account for differential trends, we do not report the results for the ethnic composition.
13
D. Increasing the comparability of boroughs
The main analysis in Table 2 uses all London boroughs, assuming that the control boroughs provide an
accurate reflection of what would have happened to the treated boroughs in the absence of the bombings.
Some of the control boroughs, however, may have systematically different housing and labour markets. We
therefore consider methods to increase the similarity between these markets across treatment and control
boroughs. First, we exclude boroughs with the highest house prices and earnings (Kensington and Chelsea),
and the lowest sales (Islington), unemployment (Richmond Upon Thames) and population (Kingston upon
Thames) from the analysis, as these boroughs might not represent good controls for the treated boroughs.
The results, reported in Panel A of Table 7, show similar effects of the bombings in comparison with Table
2.
Second, we consider a matching DD estimator based on inverse probability weighting. This strategy uses
the propensity score (i.e. the probability of treatment) to increase the similarity of the control boroughs.
Specifically, control boroughs are weighted by the odds of the propensity score (i.e. by ( p1−p) where p is
the propensity score) such that control boroughs most similar to treated boroughs receive a larger weight
and vice versa. We estimate the propensity score as a function of borough-level characteristics, using data
collected for the 2004 release of the Deprivation Index: measures of deprivation at low-level geographies.
For the housing market outcomes, we predict treatment as a function of air quality and the percentage
of housing deemed poor quality / without central heating, to analyse boroughs with comparable housing
markets to our treated boroughs. For the labour market outcomes, we predict treatment as a function
of average wages offered by firms operating in each borough and the percentage of residents with basic
education. Finally, for the population analysis, we predict treatment as a function of changes in the stock
of housing in each borough. Note that Waltham Forest is excluded from our matching analysis as it appears
in some of our alternative definitions of treatment and therefore may be ambiguous whether it is treated or
control. The results, presented in Panel B of Table 7, are similar, though somewhat weaker in the case of
our housing market outcomes, to those presented in Table 2, and the standard errors are typically larger.
Finally, we exploit the availability of several years of pre-treatment data on the outcome of interest to apply
the synthetic control method, whereby a weighted combination of control boroughs is used to estimate the
counterfactual untreated outcome. This ‘synthetic’ control group is chosen to best emulate the outcome
variable and other neighbourhood characteristics observed in the treatment group prior to the bombings
(see Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003). As we have multiple treated boroughs, we start by collapsing the
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data to create one ‘treated neighbourhood’ for which we construct a synthetic control group, made up of
a weighted combination of all control boroughs. The other neighbourhood characteristics we use to create
a synthetic borough are those mentioned above: for the housing market outcomes, we use the deprivation
index, air quality, and the percentage of housing deemed of poor quality / without central heating. For
labour market outcomes, we specify the average wages offered by firms operating in each borough and
the percentage of residents with basic education. And for the population analysis, we use changes in the
borough-level stock of housing. We again exclude Waltham Forest. In Panel C of Table 7, we present the
average difference in outcomes before and after the bombings for the treated neighbourhood, relative to the
‘synthetic’ control group. These results are again similar, with the effect on sales being insignificant due
to a larger standard error. Overall, however, we argue that, while there is some evidence of a somewhat
smaller effect of the bombings on the housing market, our results remain robust to using various methods
to increase the comparability of boroughs.
E. Learning effects
Since any property purchased today may be re-sold in future, an individual’s behaviour is likely to be
determined by their perception of general attitudes as opposed to solely their own attitude (Gautier et al.,
2009). For example, while an individual may not harbour any prejudice after terrorist attacks, they may
be deterred from living in ethnically diverse areas if they believe others (i.e. potential future buyers) do.
Gautier et al. (2009) suggest it may take time to learn about general attitudes and identify two scenarios
with different implications for how quickly house prices react to a shock. In the first scenario, people
have homogenous information on general attitudes and the effect of any shock is quickly assimilated into
market prices. In the second scenario, people have heterogeneous information on general attitudes and
price adaptation occurs more slowly as it takes time to learn about the change in general attitudes. If
uncertainty prevails, people may also delay decision-making until more information becomes available,
which may have an immediate impact on sales.
Learning effects may be relevant in the aftermath of the London bombings insofar as a series of related
incidents have kept the 7/7 bombings in the news for several years. These include (but are not confined
to) the shooting of persons suspected of terrorism (July 2005 and June 2006), subsequent attempted
terrorist attacks in London, Glasgow (June 2007), and convictions of persons involved in foiled terrorist
plots (November 2006, April, June and July 2007). Furthermore, a national inquest into the 7/7 bombings
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only delivered its verdict in 2011. This raises the possibility that public attitudes have been shaped over
the longer-term.
It is unclear whether labour market outcomes would evolve over time. It is possible that an employer
may not themselves be prejudiced but may be concerned about having an ethnically diverse workforce if
elements of their workforce harbour prejudice. It may also take the employer time to learn about general
attitudes. On the other hand, an employer may make hires according to their own prejudice, in which case
a more immediate reaction might be expected.
We investigate any potential ‘learning effects’ in two ways. First, as Figure 2 and 3 suggest the trend
changes immediately after the bombings, we restrict the sample to the period July 2003 to June 2006;
i.e. using only one year after the attacks to explore whether the effect had already materialised in 2006.
Second, we model this explicitly by extending the analysis presented in Table 5 to allow differential linear
time trends in the outcomes of interest to emerge after the bombings. Results are presented in Table 8.
Columns 1 to 3 show that, even when we restrict the data to include only one year after the bombings, we
find a drop in house prices and sales, and an increase (albeit insignificant) in unemployment rates. The
estimates for house prices and unemployment rates are about half of those in Table 2, suggesting that,
rather than showing an immediate change after the bombings, house prices and unemployment rates have
adjusted gradually. In contrast, the estimate for sales in Table 8 is similar to that in Table 2, suggesting
an immediate impact of the bombings on sales in treated compared to control boroughs.
Modelling the trends explicitly, columns 4 to 6 confirm these findings, suggesting there are learning effects
for house prices, with no immediate impact of the bombings (treated × post = 0), but evidence of a
cumulative effect (treated × post × time < 0), where time is a linear (monthly) time trend. The results
suggest that house prices in treated areas decrease by approximately 0.21% per month relative to control
areas, while sales drop immediately following the bombings, with no evidence of increased activity over
time. The results presented in column 6 indicate that labour market outcomes worsen as time progresses,
with unemployment rates increasing by 0.47% per month relative to control areas.
The lower part of the table, for columns 4 to 6, presents the estimated effects on house prices, sales and
unemployment rates after 6, 12, 18, and 24 months. This suggests that the impact of a change in attitudes
on house prices takes just under a year for a statistically significant effect to materialise, with average house
prices 12 months after the bombings being 2.27% lower in treated relative to control boroughs after one
year. Two years after the bombings, house prices in treated boroughs sell for 4.74% less than in control
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boroughs. These estimates mirror those presented in column 1 of Table 8, which estimate the average
difference across a one-year period, and those in column 1 of Table 2, which focus on the average difference
across a two-year period. Our results also suggest that it takes just under 18 months before any statistically
significant increase in unemployment rates is observed. Two years after the attacks, unemployment rates
are almost 12% higher in treated relative to control boroughs. While this may appear to be a large change,
the average pre-treatment unemployment rate in treated boroughs is 4.48% (see Table 1) suggesting that
unemployment rates climbed to just over 5% two year after the bombings.
F. Pathways
As discussed in Section III, a priori, it is unclear how the London bombings might shape perceptions of
ethnically diverse neighbourhoods. It is likely that our estimates reflect several opposing effects, including
potential changes in general attitudes towards ethnic minorities, as well as concerns relating to the safety
of living in ethnically diverse areas. In the following, we provide some tentative, albeit indirect, evidence
on the role of safety concerns in the housing market, specifically focusing on boroughs that may have
been deemed ‘less safe’ areas to live in following the bombings. First, we examine the potential concern
of living close to the site of the bombings. Indeed, if areas located closer to the bomb sites are perceived
to be at greater risk of future attacks, house prices in treated boroughs where the bombings occurred may
be more affected by safety concerns compared to other treated boroughs. The bombings took place near
Liverpool Street (Tower Hamlets), Russell Square (Camden), Edgware Road (Kensington and Chelsea),
and Tavistock Square (Camden). As Tower Hamlets is part of our treatment group, we begin by excluding
this borough from our analysis. If safety concerns operate to reduce the desirability of living in Tower
Hamlets - in addition to any changes in attitudes towards ethnic minorities - we might expect larger effects
of the bombings on housing market outcomes in this borough, and thus expect to estimate smaller effects
after dropping Tower Hamlets. Results from this exercise are presented in Panel A of Table 9, where we
retain the richer specification that allows for learning effects but present only the main effects of interest.
In Panel B, we also exclude the control boroughs where the bombings occurred (Camden, and Kensington
and Chelsea), since - if safety is an important concern - we would expect to observe larger effects once
these control boroughs are dropped. We do not find evidence of this. In fact, when we drop Tower Hamlets
in Panel A, our results are slightly stronger, whilst they are somewhat weakened by dropping the control
boroughs where the bombings occurred.
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We also indirectly investigate safety concerns by excluding boroughs subject to increased police presence
after the bombings (also known as ‘Operation Theseus’; see Draca et al. (2011)). Although Operation
Theseus was only in operation for a discrete six week period, the increased police presence may have given
the impression that these boroughs are increasingly ‘dangerous’ areas, reducing the desirability of living
in these neighbourhoods. Operation Theseus affected five boroughs: Camden, Kensington and Chelsea,
Islington, Tower Hamlets, and Westminster. Panel C of Table 9 therefore presents estimates where, in
addition to excluding Tower Hamlets, Camden, and Kensington and Chelsea (as in Panel B), we exclude
the control boroughs of Islington and Westminster from the analysis. If people perceive these control
boroughs as less save due to the increased police presence, dropping tem would increase our treatment
effect. In contrast, Panel C shows smaller effects after excluding these areas, compared to Panel B. Taken
together, these results suggest that concerns over safety in centrally-located boroughs or in boroughs
affected by the increased police presence, are not the main drivers of our findings.
Finally, since our findings indicate that the London bombings impacted on the housing and labour markets,
as well as population movements, we consider the possibility that all outcomes are driven by, for example,
population movements, or that the housing market outcomes are driven by changes in labour market
outcomes. These pathways are difficult to explore because including variables that are affected by the
treatment as control variables in our analysis is unlikely to identify a meaningful effect. For example,
holding unemployment rates constant in our house price analysis creates a comparison of the change in
house prices in high-unemployment treated boroughs (where high unemployment might arise because of, or
regardless of, treatment) with the change in house prices in high-unemployment control boroughs (where
high unemployment clearly arises regardless of treatment). These compositional differences in boroughs
characterised by the same post-treatment level of unemployment make such comparisons less desirable.
Nevertheless, this approach may be informative of the possible mechanisms underlying our results. We
include possible pathway variables in our analysis in Table 10. This shows little evidence that such pathway
variables explain our results.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigates whether the London bombings influenced attitudes towards ethnic minorities,
examining the effects on the housing market, the labour market, as well as racial segregation in Greater
London boroughs. We use a difference-in-differences approach, specifying treated boroughs as those with
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a high concentration of Asian residents prior to the bombings relative to other boroughs.
Our results suggest that, relative to control areas, house prices in the treated areas fell by approximately 2%
in the two years after the attacks, with sales and unemployment rates falling by almost 6%. Furthermore, we
find an increase in segregation: the proportion of Asians increased in treated boroughs after the bombings
relative to control boroughs. These results are robust to various sensitivity analyses, though we do find
slightly weaker housing market effects once we specify a control group that is more similar to the treatment
group.
The impact of extremist Islamic terrorist activity on attitudes towards and outcomes of ethnic minorities
is relatively under-researched in the UK, with the majority of studies focusing on the US. The results
presented in this paper suggest further research on these topics is desirable, to build a better picture of how
ethnic communities fare, and to help shape policies to address the potential for adverse outcomes. Future
research might use innovative methods to collect data at more disaggregated geographies, particularly with
respect to the ethnic composition of neighbourhoods. Furthermore, it may want to examine a wider range
of outcomes, not only at the aggregate level, but also at the individual level.
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FIGURES AND TABLES
FIGURE 1
Map of London Boroughs
Notes: Darker shading for Asian treated boroughs applied.
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FIGURE 2
Housing market outcomes
FIGURE 3
Labour market outcomes
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TABLE 1
Summary statistics in 2004, by definition of treatment
Asian
Asian
(excl. Indian)
Pakistani Black Other Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(price) 12.35 12.32 12.31 12.33 12.59 12.42
Std. error 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.28 0.22
ln(sales) 5.93 5.90 5.91 5.87 5.92 5.93
Std. error 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.25 0.26 0.31
ln(unemployment) 1.50 1.57 1.46 1.93 1.47 1.40
Std. error 0.39 0.40 0.34 0.09 0.32 0.42
ln(earnings) 6.34 6.31 6.30 6.31 6.63 6.51
Std. error 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.33 0.23
ln(population) 12.40 12.35 12.40 12.41 12.41 12.32
Std. error 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.21 0.21
ln(whites) 11.80 11.76 11.83 11.86 11.97 12.02
Std. error 0.18 0.13 0.17 0.19 0.25 0.21
ln(Asians) 11.07 10.97 10.96 10.14 10.35 9.74
Std. error 0.13 0.26 0.25 0.68 0.64 0.48
ln(blacks) 10.05 10.08 10.18 10.82 10.11 9.84
Std. error 0.54 0.55 0.51 0.12 0.54 0.77
% whites 55.73 56.05 57.02 58.55 65.28 74.93
Std. error 7.76 8.00 8.07 9.00 10.80 8.68
% Asians 26.89 25.86 24.20 13.21 14.73 8.20
Std. error 4.00 5.64 4.59 9.96 8.33 3.21
% Asians (excl. Indians) 13.96 14.44 11.04 7.18 7.65 4.30
Std. error 8.28 8.00 4.03 5.79 5.50 2.12
% Pakistani 4.58 5.09 5.47 2.65 2.63 1.58
Std. error 2.09 2.26 1.71 2.52 2.41 1.32
% blacks 10.75 11.63 11.99 20.47 11.30 10.34
Std. error 5.38 5.54 5.27 1.56 5.99 6.36
% Other 3.33 3.15 3.33 3.72 4.97 3.24
Std. error 0.72 0.62 0.72 0.38 1.04 1.37
Notes: Population estimates at 30 June 2005 are used to determine treated boroughs. Asian treated boroughs are based on Indian,
Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Other Asian populations and includes Brent, Ealing, Harrow, Hounslow, Newham, Redbridge and Tower
Hamlets. Asian (excl. Indian) treated boroughs are based on Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Other Asian populations and includes Brent,
Harrow, Hounslow, Newham, Redbridge, Tower Hamlets and Waltham Forest. Pakistani treated boroughs are based on Pakistani
populations and includes Brent, Ealing, Harrow, Hounslow, Newham, Redbridge and Waltham Forest. Black ‘pseudo treated’ boroughs
based on black populations and includes Brent, Hackney, Haringey, Lambeth, Lewisham, Newark and Southwark. Other ‘pseudo
treated’ boroughs based on Chinese or Other ethnic populations and includes Barnet, Camden, City of Westminster, Ealing,
Kensington and Chelsea, Newham and Southwark. Control boroughs refer to the comparison for Asian treated (i.e. column 1).
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TABLE 2
Housing, labour and neighbourhood outcomes by definitions of treatment
Definitions of treatment
Asian
(1)
Asian
(excl. Indian)
(2)
Pakistani
(3)
Black
(4)
Other
(5)
Panel A: Housing market outcomes
Dependent Variable: ln(price)
Treated × post -0.023** -0.021* -0.028*** 0.018 0.030
(0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.018)
Dependent Variable: ln(sales)
Treated × post -0.057** -0.058** -0.045* -0.017 -0.014
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.028) (0.027)
Panel B: Labour market outcomes
Dependent Variable: ln(unemployment)
Treated × post 0.058** 0.069** 0.066** -0.006 -0.043
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.038) (0.036)
Dependent Variable: ln(earnings)
Treated × post 0.018 0.029 0.019 -0.016 0.029
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.028)
Panel C: Demographic outcomes
Dependent Variable: ln(population)
Treated × post -0.004 -0.005 -0.009 -0.008 0.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Dependent Variable: ln(whites)
Treated × post 0.017*** 0.012 0.006 0.018*** 0.015*
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
Dependent Variable: ln(Asians)
Treated × post -0.117*** -0.108*** -0.111*** 0.005 0.018
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.038) (0.038)
Dependent Variable: ln(blacks)
Treated × post -0.026 -0.029 -0.034 -0.128*** -0.060**
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.018) (0.026)
Notes: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. All analyses control for borough fixed effects and month dummies. Standard errors clustered by
London borough. See Equation 1 for details of empirical specification. For monthly data (i.e. house prices, sales, and unemployment
rates), the number of borough-month observations is 1536. For annual data (i.e. the earnings and population variables), the number of
borough-year observations is 128. Definitions of treatment are as follows: ‘Asian’ (col. 1) is based on the population of Indians,
Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Other Asians, ‘Asian (excl. Indian)’ (col.2) is based on the population of Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and
Other Asians, ‘Pakistani’ (col. 3) is based on the population of Pakistanis, ‘Black’ (col. 4) is based on the population of blacks, and
‘Other’ (col. 5) is based on the population of Chinese or Other ethnic populations (e.g. Latin American).
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TABLE 3
Falsification analysis, incorrectly setting the treatment year
1997
(1)
1998
(2)
1999
(3)
2000
(4)
2001
(5)
2002
(6)
2003
(7)
Panel A: Housing market outcomes
Dependent Variable: ln(price)
Treated × post -0.003 0.001 -0.002 0.008 0.025 0.033 0.020
(0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.019) (0.024) (0.019)
Dependent Variable: ln(sales)
Treated × post 0.026 0.049 0.043 0.048 -0.004 -0.020 -0.014
(0.074) (0.049) (0.026) (0.032) (0.043) (0.029) (0.044)
Panel B: Labour market outcomes
Dependent Variable: ln(unemployment)
Treated × post -0.022 -0.004 0.003 0.005 0.034 0.035 0.008
(0.037) (0.043) (0.041) (0.026) (0.041) (0.049) (0.025)
Notes: Definition of treatment is ‘Asian’, based on the population of Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Other Asians. 1997 denotes
pseudo-intervention is coded as occurring in July 1997, with the data running from July 1995 to June 1999 (and similarly for the years
1998 to 2003). See also notes to Table 2.
TABLE 4
Falsification analysis, incorrectly setting the treatment year for the population analysis
Dependent variable: ln()
population
2002
(1)
population
2003
(2)
whites
2002
(3)
whites
2003
(4)
Asians
2002
(5)
Asians
2003
(6)
blacks
2002
(7)
blacks
2003
(8)
Treated × post -0.006 -0.009 0.020*** 0.015** -0.155*** -0.145*** -0.046 -0.040
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.019) (0.018) (0.044) (0.039)
Notes: Definition of treatment is ‘Asian’, based on the population of Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Other Asians. 2002 denotes
pseudo-intervention is coded as occurring in July 2002, with the data running from July 2000 to June 2004 (and similarly for the year
2003). See also notes to Table 2.
TABLE 5
Differential time trends
Dependent variable: ln()
price
(1)
sales
(2)
unemployment
(3)
population
(4)
whites
(5)
Asians
(6)
blacks
(7)
Treated × post -0.023*** -0.090** 0.056 0.002 -0.002 0.032*** 0.016
(0.008) (0.043) (0.040) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.012)
post -0.197*** 0.036* 0.317*** 0.005*** 0.010*** -0.014** -0.039***
(0.006) (0.018) (0.020) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.010)
time ( × 10) 0.094*** 0.012*** -0.095*** 0.006*** 0.000 0.061*** 0.038**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.014)
Treated × time ( × 10) 0.004 0.006 0.003 -0.003 0.009*** -0.075*** -0.021
(0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.020)
Notes: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by London borough. Definition of treatment is ‘Asian’, based on the
population of Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Other Asians. time estimates a linear time trend (where time refers to the month
for the analyses on house prices, sales and unemployment rates, and to the year for the population and ethnic group analysis), and
time× treated is the differential time trend. For house prices, sales and unemployment rates, the period of analysis spans July 1995 to
June 2007, with a total of 4608 borough-month observations (i.e 12 years). For the population analysis, the period of analysis spans
July 2000 to June 2007, with a total of 224 borough-year observations (i.e 7 years).
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TABLE 6
Variable treatment intensity
Dependent variable: ln()
price
(1)
sales
(2)
unemployment
(3)
population
(4)
% Asian*post -0.001 -0.003*** 0.003* -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
Notes: Definition of Treatment is ‘Asian’, based on the population of Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Other Asians. See also
notes to Table 2.
TABLE 7
Increasing the similarity between treatment and control boroughs
Dependent variable: ln()
price
(1)
sales
(2)
unemployment
(3)
population
(4)
Panel A: Excluding wealthiest boroughs
Treated × post -0.018* -0.051** 0.056* -0.004
(0.010) (0.021) (0.028) (0.008)
Panel B: Matching difference-in-differences
Treated × post -0.016 -0.062* 0.091*** -0.007
(0.014) (0.035) (0.021) (0.008)
Panel C: Synthetic control group
Treated × post -0.020* -0.055 0.066*** -0.014
(0.011) (0.046) (0.013) (0.012)
Notes: Definition of Treatment is ‘Asian’, based on the population of Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Other Asians. See also
notes to Table 2. Standard errors in Panel B are bootstrapped to take into account that we must estimate the propensity score in order
to construct the relevant weights in our analysis.
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TABLE 8
Allowing for learning effects after the bombings
Dependent variable: ln()
price
(1)
sales
(2)
unemployment
(3)
price
(4)
sales
(5)
unemployment
(6)
Treated × post -0.012** -0.059*** 0.026 0.003 -0.094*** 0.000
(0.006) (0.021) (0.023) (0.013) (0.032) (0.038)
Treated × post × time ( × 10) -0.021** 0.003 0.047***
(0.010) (0.026) (0.016)
post × time ( × 10) -0.021*** 0.080*** 0.019**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
post 0.029*** 0.065*** -0.016 -0.172*** -0.060*** 0.293***
(0.004) (0.013) (0.014) (0.008) (0.019) (0.018)
time ( × 10) 0.094*** 0.012*** -0.095***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Treated × time ( × 10) 0.004 0.006 0.003
(0.003) (0.008) (0.005)
% ∆ 6 months -1.01 -8.81 2.87
Std. error 0.89 3.16 3.88
% ∆ 12 months -2.27 -8.62 5.80
Std. error 0.80 3.96 4.24
% ∆ 18 months -3.52 -8.43 8.81
Std. error 1.09 5.07 4.84
% ∆ 24 months -4.74 -8.24 11.91
Std. error 1.55 6.32 5.62
Notes: Definition of treatment is ‘Asian’, based on the population of Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Other Asians. Columns 1 - 3 show analyses restricting the data to two years
prior to the bombings and only one year post (i.e. July 2005 to June 2006). Columns 4 - 6 estimate ‘learning effects’, distinguishing between the immediate and cumulative effects of
the bombings on the outcomes of interest. For example, time× post estimates a linear time trend using monthly data in the post-treatment period while time× post× is the differential
post-treatment time effect for treated boroughs. See also notes to Table 5.
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TABLE 9
Exploring potential safety concerns using the housing market
Dependent variable: ln()
price
(1)
sales
(2)
Panel A: Excluding Tower Hamlets
Treated × post 0.009 -0.091**
(0.013) (0.035)
Treated × post × time ( × 10) -0.027*** 0.014
(0.009) (0.028)
Panel B: Excluding all bombed boroughs
Treated × post 0.007 -0.085**
(0.013) (0.036)
Treated × post × time ( × 10) -0.022** 0.014
(0.009) (0.028)
Panel C: Excluding Operation Theseus boroughs
Treated × post 0.004 -0.073**
(0.014) (0.035)
Treated × post × time ( × 10) -0.017* 0.012
(0.008) (0.028)
Notes: Definition of treatment is ‘Asian’, based on the population of Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Other Asians. See also notes
to Table 2.
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TABLE 10
Including pathway variables and allowing for learning effects after the bombings
Dependent variable: ln()
price
(1)
price
(2)
price
(3)
sales
(4)
sales
(5)
unemployment
(6)
Treated × post 0.007 0.003 -0.012* -0.094*** -0.053* -0.019
(0.014) (0.014) (0.007) (0.033) (0.028) (0.021)
Treated × post × time ( × 10) -0.021** -0.019* -0.027* 0.017 0.015 0.047*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027)
post × time ( × 10) -0.024*** -0.020** 0.001 0.085*** 0.103*** -0.064***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011)
post -0.169*** -0.156*** -0.110*** 0.024 0.016 0.052***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.021) (0.019) (0.014)
time ( × 10) 0.094*** 0.089*** 0.073*** -0.015*** -0.017** 0.007
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
Treated × time ( × 10) 0.004 0.004 0.015** 0.007 -0.002 0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.015)
ln(sales) 0.043***
(0.013)
ln(unemployment) -0.054* -0.285***
(0.029) (0.047)
ln(whites) -0.856*** 0.127 -2.129***
(0.228) (0.341) (0.393)
ln(Asians) -0.003 0.134* -0.364***
(0.063) (0.079) (0.118)
ln(blacks) -0.015 0.065 0.191***
(0.031) (0.040) (0.047)
Notes: Definition of treatment is ‘Asian’, based on the population of Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Other Asians. See also notes
to Table 5. The number of borough-month observations is reduced to 2688 when including population variables as these are only
available from the treatment year 2000.
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TABLE A1
Sources and availability of data
Source Notes
Observed
from
Observed
until
Time
dimension
Housing market
House prices
Land
Registry
Data provide a complete
record of residential property
transactions in England and
Wales
July 1995 June 2007 Monthly
Sales
Land
Registry
Data provide a complete
record of residential property
transactions in England and
Wales
July 1995 June 2007 Monthly
Labour market
Unemployment rates Nomis
Based on receipt of
unemployment-related bene-
fits
July 1995 June 2007 Monthly
Residential earnings ASHE
Male average weekly full-time
earnings of residents
2002 2007
Annually
January - December
Demographics
Total population and
ethnic composition
PEEG
ONS Mid-Year Popula-
tion estimates, adjusted
for births, deaths and
national/international migra-
tion
2001 2008
Annually
July (t-1) to June (t)
Deprivation
Deprivation indices DCLG
Individual components of the
2004 UK Deprivation Indices
2004 2004
Various data sourced
between 2000-2004
Notes: Although data are available post June 2007, our analyses focuses on the period up to and including June 2007 (i.e. two years after the bombings). ASHE denotes
the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings; a 1% sample of employees appearing in the pay-as-you-earn taxation system. PEEG denotes the Office for National Statistics
Population Estimates by Ethnic Group. DCLG denotes the Department for Communities and Local Government.
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